Indexicals: Direct Reference or Presupposition?

Rob's Festshop

Emar
www.ru.nl/phil/tfl/~emar

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Outline

1. From Frege/Russell to Kripke/Kaplan
   - Proper names and indexicals
   - Wide scope
   - The KK argument
2. Neo-Descriptivism
   - Referential terms as vdSandtian presuppositions
   - Non-rigid proper names and indexicals
   - Applying KK
3. Combining rigidity and presupposition
   - Rigidity and DRT?
   - LDRT2
   - Presupposition in LDRT2

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Descriptivism vs. Referentialism

- Frege/Russell: meaning = description
  - $[\![\mathrm{Rob}]\!] \approx$ the person called Rob
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- Kripke/Kaplan: meaning = reference
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  - $[\![\mathrm{I}]\!]^c \approx$ the speaker of $c \approx$ 

Wide scope

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Definites as presuppositions as anaphors

- Geurts'97: $\mathrm{Rob} \rightsquigarrow$ 

- Hunter&Asher'05: $\mathrm{I} \rightsquigarrow$ 

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- Geurts'97: $\mathrm{Rob} \rightsquigarrow$ 

- Hunter&Asher'05: $\mathrm{I} \rightsquigarrow$ 

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- Geurts'97: $\mathrm{Rob} \rightsquigarrow$ 

- Hunter&Asher'05: $\mathrm{I} \rightsquigarrow$ 

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- Geurts'97: $\mathrm{Rob} \rightsquigarrow$ 

- Hunter&Asher'05: $\mathrm{I} \rightsquigarrow$ 

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Bound indexicals?

- Heim: feature deletion/binding under morphological agreement
- Neo-Descriptivist alternative: presupposition binding?

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Kamp's external anchors

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

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

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

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Layers

- represent different types of information at separate layers, connected by discourse referents.
  - Kripke/Kaplan-layer: indexicals, names,...
  - Frege-layer: "what is said", asserted content

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speaker(x)
speak(x)

(3) The speaker is speaking

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Layers

- represent different types of information at separate layers, connected by discourse referents.
  - Kripke/Kaplan-layer: indexicals, names,...
  - Frege-layer: "what is said", asserted content

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Layered semantics: the basic ingredients

- all semantic notions relativized to a layer
  - iff there is an embedding g s.t.:
    - g extends f
    - g maps φ's discourse referents into the domain
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Adding a 2nd dimension

- Kaplanian 2D models: $\mathcal{M} = \langle C, W, D, I \rangle$
- 'what is said' by φ in $c = [\![\varphi]\!]^c =$
  - evaluate red layer in c: $[\![\varphi]\!]^{\emptyset}_{c}$
  - if true, $f :=$ its minimal truthful embedding
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Layered PrelDRS construction

- Zimmermann's Hypothesis L: "lexical items are always deictic or absolute"
  - compositionally generated PrelDRS bipartitioned into Fregean and Kripke/Kaplan layers

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

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

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

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- predictions:
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Only I did my homework

x
emar(x)
speak(x)

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

(≈ only those *y*s that are equal to *z* did *w*'s homework)

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Rob$_i$ thinks that I$_i$ am a linguist

x y
emar(x) speak(x) rob(y)

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

(≈ Rob believes to inhabit a context whose center is a linguist)

Conlusions

Best of Neo-Descriptivism and Referentialism

- descriptivism:
  - unified account of definites as presuppositions
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    - compositional PrelDRS
  - 2LDRT instead of anchors
  - account for (rare) bound readings
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- referentialism:
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Open question: how to account for the more flexible proper name resolution? tweak Layer Faithfulness or Hypothesis L?

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