

A. Motivation

- (1) John is looking for a unicorn.
- (2) John painted a unicorn.
- (i) both allow for a non-specific construal.
- (ii) both can report relations between existing and (specific) non-existent objects

(i) x Rs an N _____
∴ Some (specific) individual is Red by x

(i) x Rs an N _____
∴ There exists an N

(ii) x Rs an N
Every N is an M
Every M is an N
∴ x Rs an M

B. Readings of “paint” (as a transitive verb)
extensional

x paints y \Leftrightarrow x covers y with paint
(\Leftrightarrow PAINT(x,y))

- creation
x paints a Y \Leftrightarrow x creates a Y by painting
(\Leftrightarrow (Ez) [PAINT(x,z) CAUSE BECOME(Y(z))])

- depiction
x paints a Y \Leftrightarrow x creates a Y-representation by painting
(\Leftrightarrow (Ez) [PAINT(x,z) CAUSE BECOME(Y-representation(z))])

C. Pictorial Content

[weak Propositionalism: Any content can be defined in terms of propositional content]

(P) *Strong propositionalism*
Any content is a proposition, i.e. grasping content can always be explained in terms of grasping propositions

Parsons’s Hamlet Ellipsis

“x paints a Q” means “x paints* that there is a Q”
(paints* is an underlying predicate holding between x and a proposition p just in case x creates a picture the content of which implies p”).

Sceptic's analysis

"x paints a Q means" "x paints* that something looks like a Q"

Larson's Paraphrase:

"x paints a Q" means "x paints* that there is a Q in front of x"

De se analysis

"x paints a Q" means "x paints⁺ that there is a Q in front of him^{**}"

Counterfactual analysis (tentative)

"x paints a Q" is true iff x creates a picture by painting the content of which is a sub-property of being a z such that, for any (normally sighted) y, if a Q were in front of y, then x would be a visual alternative of x"

D. Specific Reading

... by Kaplanian *de re*:

"x paints a Q" means "for some y: Q(y), and x is (suitably) related to y by R, and x paints* that there is a Q in front of him* and related to him by R".

NB: Suitability implies uniqueness.

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